Quantum key distribution (QKD) proposals for quantum-mechanically secure communications include mechanisms that allow the detection of eavesdropping, but they require the previous use of a quantum channel to exchange the cryptographic key. We present a cryptographic protocol based on entanglement swapping and quantum dense coding that, making use of previous entanglement between the two parties, allows to establish a completely secure communication in the absence of a quantum channel. In addition, we also show that this protocol solves the key storage problem present in most of QKD schemes and in classical cryptography.
Introduction
Cryptography has been the first field to which quantum information processing has been applied [1, 2] bringing a whole new dimension to security in communications. The resulting new discipline, quantum cryptography, bases its security in the laws of nature as revealed by quantum mechanics instead of on unproven assumptions concerning the computational complexity of some algorithms, as it is the case of classical cryptography (public-key distribution algorithms). In fact, Shor's results [3] indicate that quantum algorithms can be devised to have the potential to ruin a large part of contemporary cryptography schemes. Over the last few years there have been several experimental demonstrations of quantum cryptography [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] , which seem to indicate that the prospects for the future mainstream use of these techniques are good. The vast majority of the quantum cryptographic protocols proposed [2, 9, 4] are based on the idea of QKD. Essentially, the parties, who initially share no secret information, come into the possession of a secret key by means of a protocol that requires the existence of a quantum channel on which some particles are transmitted. The range of application of this approach is quite broad, but one can easily imagine communication scenarios (e.g. military aircraft communications) in which a quantum channel between parties is not easily available. In this correspondence we show that in these situations one can also benefit from the added security incorporated by quantum theory to communications if the concepts of entanglement swapping (ES) [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] , quantum dense-coding (DC) [15] , and the previous existence of entanglement between parties are employed.
The protocol
Assume that Alice and Bob plan to take part in a secret mission (e.g. Alice in an aircraft carrier and Bob in an aircraft). Before the mission begins, both meet at briefing and each receives from the commander-in-chief M particles entangled with those of her/his partner. If we denote Alice's particles by A i and Bob's by B i (i = 1, . . . , M ), the states of the entangled particles are the set {|α AiBi ; i = 1, . . . , M }. We will further assume that the entanglement between the particles is in the form of the Bell states
Suppose now that the mission starts and Alice needs to send a secret message M bits long (where M is even, without loss of generality) to Bob through a classical channel between them (a standard RF channel). Before transmitting any information, Alice breaks the M bits of her message into pairs of bits that we write as (c j , c j+1 ), where j is any odd number between 1 and M . Depending on the four possible values of these pairs, she performs on her particle A j one of the following four unitary quantum operations:
1. Identity operation (1 Aj ) for the pair '00': No change is made on the original state.
2. State exchange (Ŝ Aj ) for the pair '01': Local |0 transforms into |1 and vice versa.
3. State-dependent phase shift (P Aj ) for '10': It transforms local |0 into −|0 and leaves |1 unmodified.
4. State exchange and phase shift together (Q Aj ) for '11'.
These operations change the initial state of the particles, |α Aj ,Bj , into, respectively, |φ Table 1 : Correspondence between the outcome of the measurement performed by Bob and the pair of bits received. Both allow to obtain the pair of bits of the secret message sent by Alice.
of the particles B j and B j+1 on his Bell base. The outcome of this projection together with the two classical bits sent by Alice give unambiguously, according to the correspondence shown in Table 1 , the two bits sent by Alice. Therefore, the entanglement between the two sets of M particles creates an effective quantum cryptographic key of length equal to that of the message (M bits). As it is well known [16, 17] this constitutes a "one-time pad", which is an absolutely secure method of encryption.
Robustness
It can be argued that Alice and Bob, at briefing with the commander-in-chief, can directly receive a secret sequence of random bits (a key) to encrypt their future messages (instead of the M pairs of entanglement particles). The principal problem of this classical procedure is the lack of security (the so-called "key storage problem"): Eve can break into the commander-in-chief's premises and copy the key. There is, in principle, no way in which Alice and Bob can detect such an attack. In our protocol, the security of the established communication channel resides on the particles owned by Alice and Bob, whose quantum state cannot be cloned. But one can think of more sophisticated attacks: Before any communication, Eve may have quantum-physical access to the M pairs of particles shared by Alice and Bob, change their entanglement, and even entangle them with some extra particles of her own. In eavesdropping situations like this our protocol has to be complemented with a verification stage in which, prior to any communication, both parties verify the state of some pairs of their entangled particles. Lo and Chou [18] , making use of previous results of Bennett et al. [19] , have given an explicit procedure to perform such verification with just local operations and measurements on m random pairs of entangled particles (which have to be discarded afterwards), and the subsequent comparison of the results through a classical channel. Specifically, their quantum verification scheme guarantees that no cheating strategy by Eve can succeed with a probability greater than 2 −m . Therefore, for a given detection probability, P d , one
can obtain the number of extra entangled pairs of particles, m, that are required in the verification stage as m = − log 2 (1 − P d ).
Conclusion
We have shown that with the appropriate local quantum operations, pre-existing entanglement between parties, in the form of M + m pairs of particles (M for the actual message, and m to verify that no eavesdropping can occur with a probability greater than P d ), can be used to make communications over standard classical channels quantum-mechanically secure.
